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Abstract
Traditional single-user security models do not necessarily capture the power of real-world
attackers. A scheme that is secure in the single-user setting may not be as secure in the multi-user
setting. Inspired by the recent analysis of Schnorr signatures in the multi-user setting, we analyse
Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS) signatures and Boneh-Gentry-Lynn-Shacham (BGLS) aggregate
signatures in the multi-user setting. We obtain a tight reduction from the security of key-prefixed
BLS in the multi-user model to normal BLS in the single-user model. We introduce a multi-user
security model for general aggregate signature schemes, in contrast to the original “chosen-key”
security model of BGLS that is analogous to the single-user setting of a signature scheme. We
obtain a tight reduction from the security of multi-user key-prefixed BGLS to the security of
multi-user key-prefixed BLS in the standard model. Finally, we apply a technique of Katz and
Wang to present a tight security reduction from a variant of multi-user key-prefixed BGLS to the
computational co-Diffie-Hellman (co-CDH) problem. All of our results for BLS and BGLS use
type III pairings.
1 Introduction
It is important to have security models that reflect real-world conditions. Proving that a scheme
is secure against a particular type of adversary is less valuable when it does not correspond to the
adversary of such a system deployed in the real world. While single-user settings are much easier to
analyse, they do not capture many real-world attacks. For example, computing the greatest common
divisors of RSA moduli from different public keys makes it possible to recover their corresponding
private keys if these moduli share a prime factor [12]. A generic MAC scheme’s security in the
multi-user setting is not equivalent to its security in the single-user setting—a MAC forger in the
multi-user setting has an advantage over a MAC forger in the single-user setting by a factor of the
number of users, n [9].
Although digital signatures have existed for over 30 years, there is still debate about the most
appropriate security models and how to interpret security reductions when choosing security parame-
ters. As recently as late 2015, the security of Schnorr signatures in the multi-user setting relative to
their security in the single-user setting was not well understood [4, 5, 15]. This discussion about the
security of Schnorr signatures inspired our analysis of two more signature schemes.
1.1 Overview and Our Contributions
In this paper, we analyse the multi-user security of two related signature schemes: the Boneh-Lynn-
Shacham (BLS) signature scheme [7] and the Boneh-Gentry-Lynn-Shacham (BGLS) aggregate
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Figure 1: Overview of our results for BLS and BGLS and how they compare to reductions in the
single-user setting.
signature scheme [6]. In Sections 1.2–1.4, we review Schnorr and BLS signatures, unforgeability, and
single-user vs. multi-user settings. In Section 1.5, we summarize the history of multi-user Schnorr
signature security and related work.
Next, in Section 2, we present a reduction from multi-user BLS security to single-user BLS
security. It is not tight; the gap is about min{n,qs + 1}. We go on to show in Theorem 1 that
with key-prefixing, the security of multi-user BLS does tightly reduce to the security of single-user
BLS. Although we were unable to obtain a tight reduction from the security of multi-user BLS to
single-user BLS without key-prefixing—which does not eliminate the possibility that multi-user
forgery is easier—it is in fact known that, in the random oracle model, multi-user BLS has the same
tightness loss as single-user BLS when it is reduced directly to the co-CDH problem [14]. We explain
this in more detail at the end of Section 2.
In Section 3, we consider BGLS, a natural extension of BLS and the first proposed aggregate
signature scheme. We introduce a truly multi-user security model for general aggregate signature
schemes, as opposed to the chosen-key model of BGLS, in Section 3.1. In Theorem 2, we present a
tight reduction from key-prefixed multi-user BGLS security to key-prefixed multi-user BLS security in
the standard model. Finally, in Theorem 3, we present a tight security reduction for the key-prefixed
BGLS scheme in the multi-user setting, also in the random oracle model, by further modifying BGLS
to use a technique of Katz and Wang [13].
Figure 1 summarizes our results and shows where they fit in relation to known results. The
tightness of reductions is indicated with “tight” or with the tightness gap. “KP” indicates the variant
where keys are prefixed to messages before signing, and “KW” indicates the Katz-Wang variants,
where a random bit is prefixed to a message before signing. Reductions are in the standard model
unless otherwise indicated with “RO” for “random oracle.”
2
1.2 Review of Schnorr and BLS Signatures, Notation
See Table 1 for an overview of the Schnorr [19] and BLS [7] signature schemes. For simplicity, we
omit the role of the security parameter in Setup. Schnorr signatures are mentioned in this paper for
illustrative purposes; although we contribute no results about Schnorr signatures, the history of their
security models inspired this work.
Table 1: Summary of the Schnorr and BLS signature schemes
Schnorr [19] BLS [7]
Setup G = 〈g〉, prime order p
H : {0,1}∗→ Zp, full-domain
G1 = 〈g1〉, G2 = 〈g2〉, GT , prime order p
H : {0,1}∗→ G1, full-domain
e : G1×G2→ GT , bilinear
KeyGen x←$Zp
sk= x ∈ Zp
pk= gx ∈ G
x←$Zp
sk= x ∈ Zp
pk= (y1,y2) = (g1x,g2x) ∈ G1×G2
Sign(sk,m) k←$Zp
σ = (h,s)
= (H(gk||m),sk·h+ k)
∈ Zp×Zp
σ = H(m)sk ∈ G1
Ver(pk,σ ,m) h ?= H(gs·pk−h||m) e(H(m),y2) ?= e(σ ,g2)
Although the BLS scheme was introduced for symmetric pairings, where G1 = G2, we use the
modified scheme due to Chatterjee et al. [8] that also works for asymmetric pairings where no
efficiently computable isomorphism from G2 to G1 is known (“type III” pairings).
The security of the BLS signature scheme with type III pairings depends on the hardness of the
computational co-Diffie-Hellman (co-CDH) problem in G1×G2: given (g1x,g2x) ∈ G1×G2 and
h ∈ G1, compute hx ∈ G1. We say that a problem is (t,ε)-hard if there exists no adversary that can
solve it in time at most t with probability at least ε , where the probability is taken over all possible
instances of the problem and any coin flips the adversary makes.
Note that BLS public keys contain both g1x and g2x, but only the latter is used for verification.
Without g1x, it is unknown [8] whether there is a reduction from BLS forgery to solving the co-CDH
problem (the opposite direction of that which we examine in this paper). If a forger receives a public
key (g1x,g2x), it is straightforward to see that, given a co-CDH solver, it can forge a signature on any
message without even making a single signing query.
We let tm and te represent the times required to compute a multiplication or exponentiation in G1
or G2. We write [n] for the set of integers {1, . . . ,n}. We write x←$ S to denote picking a value of x
uniformly at random from the set S. We let x||y denote the concatenation of (the binary representations
of) x and y. A multi-set is a set that may contain repetitions.
1.3 Standard and Strong Unforgeability
The widely-accepted notion of security for a digital signature scheme is resistance to existential
forgery under adaptive chosen-message attacks, formalized by Goldwasser, Micali, and Rivest in
1988 [11]. A digital signature scheme is (single-user) (t,ε,qs)-existentially unforgeable under
adaptive chosen-message attacks (EUF-CMA) if there exists no forgerF that, given one challenge
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Figure 2: Four types of existential forgery experiments in the standard model. The public keys are
generated with KeyGen. Similar experiments exist in the random oracle model, where the forgers can
also make at most qh queries to a hashing oracle.
public key generated by KeyGen and adaptively making at most qs queries to a signing oracle, runs in
time at most t and can produce with probability at least ε a signature on a message it did not submit
to the signing oracle. See Figure 2a for a diagram representing the EUF-CMA experiment.
For probabilistic signature schemes, there exists a variant of existential unforgeability: “strong
unforgeability,” introduced by An, Dodis, and Rabin in 2002 [1]. A digital signature scheme is
(single-user) strongly (t,ε,qs)-existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen-message attacks
(SEUF-CMA) if there is no forger F , with the same properties as above, that can produce a new
signature on any message, including the messages it submitted to the signing oracle. (See Figure 2b.)
Although the notions of standard and strong unforgeability are identical for BLS, the difference is
important in understanding the history of the security models of Schnorr signatures.
1.4 Single-User and Multi-User Settings
In the standard and strong unforgeability models, the adversary receives one target public key for
which it must forge a signature. However, since public keys are public, a real-world adversary has the
choice of which public key to target. Perhaps it is easier to forge a signature for any public key from
a set rather than one specific public key. That is, perhaps forgery in the multi-user setting, where the
adversary chooses which public key to target, is easier than forgery in the single-user setting. We will
compare these two settings.
The study of signature schemes in the multi-user setting was initiated by Menezes and Smart
in 2001 [18]. A digital signature scheme is (multi-user) (t,ε,n,qs)-existentially unforgeable un-
der adaptive chosen-message attacks (MU-EUF-CMA) if there exists no forger F that, given n
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challenge public keys generated by KeyGen and adaptively making at most qs queries to a signing
oracle, runs in time at most t and with probability at least ε , can produce a signature for one of
the n users on a message that it did not submit to the signing oracle for this user. (See Figure 2c.)
For probabilistic signature schemes, there is again a strong unforgeability variant of multi-user
security. A digital signature scheme is (multi-user) strongly (t,ε,n,qs)-existentially unforgeable
under adaptive chosen-message attacks (MU-SEUF-CMA) if there is no forgerF , with the same
properties as above, that can produce a new signature on any message by any of the users, including
messages submitted to the signing oracle for this user. (See Figure 2d.)
1.5 A Brief History of Multi-User Schnorr Signature Security and Related
Work
In this section, we review the security of Schnorr signatures in the multi-user model. We will employ
similar techniques to develop a reduction for BLS signatures in the multi-user setting.
In 2002, Galbraith, Malone-Lee, and Smart claimed that single-user unforgeability (EUF-CMA)
tightly implies multi-user unforgeability (MU-EUF-CMA) for any Schnorr-like signature scheme [10].
However, the GMLS reduction, which explains how to construct a single-user forger given a multi-
user forger, contains an error, pointed out by Bernstein in October 2015 [5]. The error arises from
the single-user forgerF1 using its challenge public key y to create each of the public keys it gives
the multi-user forgerFn. To answer each ofFn’s signature queries,F1 must always query its own
signing oracle for y with the same message. The analysis ofF1’s success probability overlooks the
possibility thatFn’s forgery is for a message with which it previously queried the signing oracle (for
any of the users). In addition to pointing out the error, Bernstein proved that single-user security for
Schnorr signatures (EUF-CMA) tightly implies multi-user security for key-prefixed Schnorr signatures
(MU-EUF-CMA) in the standard model. He also argued that such a reduction for Schnorr signatures
without key-prefixing is unlikely to exist.
In November 2015, Kiltz, Masny, and Pan gave a reduction showing that strong single-user
security (SEUF-CMA) tightly implies strong multi-user security (MU-SEUF-CMA) for Schnorr
signatures in the random oracle model [15]. In response, Bernstein pointed out that the assumption
of strong unforgeability is less well-understood: “Having to assume ‘strong’ unforgeability isn’t
as good as assuming standard unforgeability—there could be huge differences in security between
these two attack targets” [4]. This work by Bernstein, Kiltz, Masny, and Pan was in the context of
IETF standardization of elliptic-curve based signature schemes. Their results played a role in the
Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG)’s selection of a proposal [4], illustrating the importance of
appropriate security models and highlighting the difficulty of interpreting security reductions when
implementing schemes.
Kiltz, Masny, and Pan later generalized their work to reduce the security of signature schemes
obtained from identification schemes via the Fiat-Shamir transform in the multi-user setting to the
security of their underlying identification schemes [16]. The tightness of this security reduction is
independent of the number of users and does not require key-prefixing. Other recent work proved
that a tightness loss in the number of users is unavoidable for some signature schemes when reducing
security in the multi-user setting to the single-user setting [2]. This result applies to adversaries who
can corrupt (i.e., learn the private key of) all but one of the users.
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Figure 3: Reduction from multi-user security to single-user security for BLS.
2 BLS Signatures
The security reduction for BLS signatures in the single-user setting loses tightness by a factor of
qs, the number of signature queries a forger can make. We restate the result here, and note that the
tightness loss of qs is optimal in the sense that there exists no tighter reduction [17].
[BLS security reduction [7, 8]] If solving the co-CDH problem in G1×G2 is (t ′,ε ′)-hard, then the
BLS signature scheme is (t,ε,qh,qs)-secure against (single-user) existential forgery under adaptive
chosen-message attacks, for
t = t ′− (qh+qs)te−qhtm, and
ε = ε ′e(qs+1).
For the multi-user security of any signature scheme, it is known that there exists a non-tight
reduction to single-user security, where the tightness loss is the number of users [10]. A natural
question is whether a tighter reduction exists for BLS. Although we were not able to find a tight
reduction in the standard model without key-prefixing, our reduction—illustrated in Figure 3—loses
tightness by a factor of about min{n,qs + 1}. We omit the details of this non-tight reduction and
instead supplement Figure 3 with some intuition and an overview of the proof.
The single-user forgerF1 embeds its challenge public key into a fraction α of the n public keys
it provides to the multi-user forger Fn. When Fn queries the signing oracle for a signature by a
user whose public key does not depend onF1’s challenge public key,F1 can simply compute the
signature. Otherwise, it answersFn’s signature query by forwarding it to its own signing oracle and
multiplying the result by the appropriate power of the message’s hash.
Although F1 can always answer Fn’s signature queries, the reduction can fail even if Fn
successfully forges a signature. ForF1 to succeed as well, two more conditions must be met: user i∗
must have a pk-dependent key, andFn must not have requested a signature on m∗ by any user with a
pk-dependent key. Given that Fn succeeded, the first condition is met with probability at least α .
GivenFn’s success and the first condition being met, the second condition is met with probability at
least (1−α)min{n−1,qs}, since the number of signaturesFn can request on m∗ is limited by the number
of users and the total number of signatures it can request. Therefore, givenFn’s success,F1 succeeds
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Figure 4: Reduction from multi-user BLS-KP security to single-user BLS security.
with probability at least α · (1−α)min{n−1,qs}, which is maximized for α = 1/min{n,qs + 1} and
corresponds to a tightness gap of about e ·min{n,qs+1}.
This non-tight reduction leaves open the question of whether there is an attack on multi-user
BLS that is much faster than on single-user BLS. Recall that for Schnorr signatures, there were two
approaches to making a multi-user to single-user security reduction tight: strong unforgeability and
prefixing keys to messages. Since BLS signatures are not probabilistic, we try the second approach:
we establish a reduction from multi-user key-prefixed BLS security to single-user BLS security. Let
BLS-KP refer to the key-prefixed variant of BLS, whose details are in Table 2. We obtain a result for
BLS analogous to Bernstein’s for Schnorr signatures. See Figure 4 for an illustration of this tight
reduction and Theorem 1 for its details.
Table 2: Summary of the BLS-KP signature scheme
Setup,KeyGen Same as BLS (Table 1)
Sign(sk,m) σ = H(pk||m)sk ∈ G1
Ver(pk,σ ,m) e(H(pk||m),y2) ?= e(σ ,g2)
Theorem 1 (Reduction from multi-user BLS-KP security to single-user BLS security). If the
BLS signature scheme is resistant to (t ′,ε,qs)-existential forgery under adaptive chosen-message
attacks in the single-user setting (EUF-CMA), then BLS-KP is resistant to (t,ε,n,qs)-existential
forgery under adaptive chosen-message attacks in the multi-user setting (MU-EUF-CMA), for any
t,n, and qs satisfying
t = t ′+(2n+qs+1)(tm+ te).
Proof. We proceed in the usual manner, by proving the contrapositive: given a multi-user (t,ε,n,qs)-
forgerFn for BLS-KP, we build a single-user (t ′,ε,qs)-forgerF1 for BLS.F1 receives a challenge
public key pk= (y1,y2) and has access to a signing oracle Σ1 for pk. F1 givesFn the following n
public keys:
pki = (y1,i,y2,i) = (y1 ·g1ri ,y2 ·g2ri)
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where ri←$Zp. F1 records (i,ri) for each of the n public keys.
F1 must simulate responses from a signing oracle forFn, which can make qs signature queries.
To answer the query (m, i) for a signature on m by the user with key pki,F1 requests a signature on
the message pki||m from Σ1 and then computes Sign′i(m) = Sign(pki||m) ·H(pki||m)ri . This signature
is valid:
e(Sign(pki||m) ·H(pki||m)ri ,g2) = e(Sign(pki||m),g2) · e(H(pki||m),g2ri)
= e(H(pki||m),y2) · e(H(pki||m),g2ri)
= e(H(pki||m),y2,i).
After time at most t and with probability at least ε , Fn outputs a forgery (σ ,m∗, i∗) that is
new and valid: (m∗, i∗) was not queried to Σn and Ver(pki∗ ,σ ,m∗) = 1, specifically, e(σ ,g2) =
e(H(pki∗ ||m∗),y2,i∗). Then,F1 computes σ ′=σ ·H(pki∗ ||m∗)−ri∗ and outputs the forgery (σ ′,pki∗ ||m∗).
This signature is a valid forgery on pki∗ ||m∗ by the user with public key pk since
e(σ ′,g2) = e(σ ,g2) · e(H(pki∗ ||m∗)−ri∗ ,g2)
= e(H(pki∗ ||m∗),y2,i∗) · e(H(pki∗ ||m∗),g2−ri∗ )
= e(H(pki∗ ||m∗),y2 ·g2ri∗ ·g2−ri∗ )
= e(H(pki∗ ||m∗),y2).
There is a one-to-one correspondence between the signing queries ofF1 andFn, soF1 made
exactly qs signing queries and never queried Σ1 with pki∗ ||m∗ since Fn never queried Σ′n with
(m∗, i∗). F1’s success probability is exactlyFn’s success probability ε . Finally,F1’s only additional
work was computing 2n+ qs + 1 multiplications and 2n+ qs + 1 exponentiations in G1 or G2, so
t ′ = t+(2n+qs+1)(tm+ te), giving the required bounds.
By composing the BLS security reduction and Theorem 1, we can obtain a security reduction for
BLS in the multi-user setting with key-prefixing. One might be tempted to conclude that key-prefixing
is necessary to preserve BLS security in a multi-user setting, but it is not. In fact, the security of BLS
in the multi-user setting can be directly reduced to the hardness of the co-CDH problem, with the
same tightness loss as BLS in the single-user setting [14]. To see this, first consider the single-user
BLS security reduction. The co-CDH solver embeds one part of the co-CDH instance in the public
key it gives to the forger, and the other part in a particular fraction of the message hashes. It succeeds
if it was able to answer all of the forger’s signature queries, if the forger succeeded, and if the message
on which the forger forged a signature was one of the special fraction of messages. In the multi-user
BLS security reduction, the co-CDH solver can simply embed the first part of the co-CDH instance
in all of the public keys it provides the BLS forger. The rest of the reduction (and thus, the analysis)
is the same.
Now that we have a tight reduction relating the security of multi-user BLS (with key-prefixing)
and single-user BLS, we turn our attention to the BGLS aggregate signature scheme.
3 Aggregate Signatures
Aggregate signature schemes combine multiple users’ signatures on multiple (possibly different)
messages. Their current chosen-key security model does not reflect the possibility that an adversary
may consider it sufficient to forge a signature involving any one user, rather than a given user.
Boneh, Gentry, Lynn, and Shacham introduced aggregate signatures in 2003 [6]. These schemes
allow compressing many signatures into one signature of shorter length, sometimes even independent
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Figure 5: Two types of aggregate existential forgery experiments in the random oracle model. The
public keys pk and pk1, . . . ,pkn are generated with KeyGen.
of the number of included signatures. A general aggregate signature scheme comprises five algorithms
(Setup, KeyGen, Sign, Agg, AggVer) on four sets (public keys, secret keys, messages, and signatures).
Setup, KeyGen, and Sign work exactly as they do in a normal signature scheme, except that KeyGen
is run once for each user. Agg takes two or more signatures and outputs one (aggregate) signature.
AggVer takes a signature, a multi-set of k ≤ nmax public key-message pairs, and outputs 1 if the
signature is a valid aggregate. While sequential aggregate signature schemes exist, we consider only
general aggregate signature schemes where aggregation can be performed by anyone in any order. In
the following experiments, we always assume without loss of generality that the messages in each
aggregate signature are numbered so that the first one corresponds to the non-trivial component of
that signature, as we describe below.
3.1 General Aggregate Signature Security Model
The original security model is the “aggregate chosen-key security model” [6], in which the adversary
receives one public key generated with KeyGen and can adaptively query a signing oracle with
messages of its choice. Its goal is to output a valid, non-trivial aggregate signature on k ∈ [nmax]
messages for which it chose k− 1 of the public keys. “Non-trivial” means that the first message
(corresponding to the challenge public key) was not queried to the signing oracle. See Figure 5a for a
diagram of this experiment, the aggregate existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen-message
attacks (A-EUF-CMA) experiment. We write pk or pki for public keys generated using KeyGen, and
pk′j for public keys chosen by the adversary. The keys it chooses may or may not be equal to some of
the keys it received as input.
We believe the chosen-key security model is analogous to the single-user setting for (non-
aggregate) digital signatures: the adversary is given one public key to target. We propose a new
security model that is truly a multi-user model—the forger receives n challenge public keys generated
by KeyGen and it can choose which one or ones to target, eventually forging an aggregate signature
on at most nmax messages. A valid, non-trivial aggregate signature in this model must include at least
one message signed by a user with one of the challenge public keys, and the forger must not have
requested a signature on this message by this user from the signing oracle. The other public keys,
if any, may be challenge keys or they may have been generated by the forger. We call this model
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“multi-user aggregate existential forgery under adaptive chosen-message attacks” (MU-A-EUF-CMA).
(See Figure 5b.)
Chosen-key aggregate forgery is at least as hard as multi-user aggregate forgery: an aggregate
forger in the chosen-key model can easily be translated to an aggregate forger in the multi-user model.
For the converse, however, we do not know of a tight reduction, only one that loses tightness by a
factor of the number of users, n. This straightforward, general result does not require the random
oracle model.
Proposition 1 (Reduction from multi-user to chosen-key aggregate signature security) If an
aggregate signature scheme is resistant to aggregate (t,ε,nmax,qs)-existential forgery under adaptive
chosen-message attacks (A-EUF-CMA), then it is resistant to multi-user aggregate (t,ε,n,nmax,qs)-
existential forgery under adaptive chosen-message attacks (MU-A-EUF-CMA) for any t, ε , n, nmax,
and qs satisfying
t = t ′−qstSign− (n−1)tKeyGen, and
ε = ε ′n
where tSign and tKeyGen are the times required to run Sign and KeyGen.
This result applies to any general aggregate signature scheme, and could be composed with a
security reduction in the A-EUF-CMA model to obtain a security reduction in the MU-A-EUF-CMA
model. For BGLS, however, it is possible to obtain a tighter security reduction by first reducing
security to the underlying signature scheme, BLS, in the multi-user model.
Our reductions involving BGLS aggregate forgers are in the random oracle model. We make the
following simplifying assumptions:
• When a forger requests a signature on a message from a signing oracle, it has already obtained
the hash of this message from the hashing oracle.
• A forger never makes the same query twice.
• When a forger outputs a signature on a message (or messages), every message was previously
hashed.
3.2 BGLS and Key-Prefixing
Recall that we used key-prefixing to obtain a tight reduction from multi-user BLS-KP security to
single-user BLS security, as did Bernstein for Schnorr signatures [5]. Key-prefixing is also relevant
to BGLS signatures, but for a different reason: to prevent a rogue-key attack. In such an attack, a
malicious user claims its public key is some function of an honest user’s public key, but without
actually knowing the associated secret key. Table 3 summarizes the basic BGLS scheme, which must
be modified or restricted to prevent a rogue-key attack.
The rogue key attack, identified in the original BGLS paper [6], works as follows. Suppose
honest user 1 has public key pk1 = (y1,1,y2,1). Malicious user 2 can pick any integer x ∈ Zp and
publish pk2 = (g1x · y1,1−1,g2x · y2,1−1) as its public key. Then, user 2 can compute σA = H(m)x for
any message m and claim that it is an aggregate signature on m comprising signatures by both itself
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Table 3: Basic BGLS aggregate signature scheme [6]
Setup G1 = 〈g1〉, G2 = 〈g2〉, GT , prime order p
H : {0,1}∗→ G1, full-domain
e : G1×G2→ GT , bilinear
KeyGen x←$Zp
sk= x ∈ Zp
pk= (y1,y2) = (g1x,g2x) ∈ G1×G2
Sign(sk,m) σ = H(m)sk ∈ G1
Agg(σ1, . . . ,σk) σA =∏ki=1σi ∈ G1
AggVer(σA,(pk1,m1), . . . ,(pkk,mk)) ∏ki=1 e(H(mi),y2,i)
?
= e(σA,g2)
and honest user 1. This signature is valid since
e(H(m),y2,1) · e(H(m),y2,2) = e
(
H(m),y2,1 ·g2x · y2,1−1
)
= e(H(m),g2x)
= e(σA,g2) .
This attack applies to the basic BGLS scheme as defined in Table 3 in both the original A-EUF-CMA
model and our new MU-A-EUF-CMA model. Boneh, Gentry, Lynn, and Shacham suggested applying
one of the following three countermeasures:
• Require users to prove knowledge of their private keys (e.g., by disclosing their private keys to
a trusted party).
• Require users to prove possession of their private keys (e.g., by signing random messages that
will never be used in practice).
• Require all of the messages in one aggregate signature to be distinct.
The authors suggested that the last option might be the simplest, and further suggested that to achieve
distinctness of messages, a user could simply prefix its public key to a message, creating an “enhanced”
or “key-prefixed” message, before hashing it. Then, the distinctness requirement would apply only to
each user’s messages in the aggregate, rather than all messages in the aggregate.
In their 2007 paper, Bellare, Namprempre, and Neven pointed out that while hashing enhanced
messages eliminates the rogue-key attack, the requirement for distinct enhanced messages is restrictive
and unnecessary [3]. There may be applications where multiple signatures by the same user on
the same message need to be aggregated. They suggested that an “unrestricted” scheme—with no
requirement for enhanced messages to be distinct—is more practical and is sufficient for preventing
the rogue-key attack. See Table 4 for this unrestricted, key-prefixed variant “BGLS-KP.”
Bellare, Namprempre, and Neven presented a tight reduction from the unforgeability of BGLS-KP
to the unforgeability of BLS in the random oracle model [3]. Composing this reduction with the
standard BLS security reduction yields a security reduction for BGLS-KP that loses tightness by a
factor of qs. Then, using a technique of Katz and Wang [13], they presented a tight security reduction
for a variant of BGLS with key-prefixing, “BGLS-KP-KW,” where each signer further enhances a
message before hashing and signing it by also prefixing a random bit of its choice.
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Table 4: BGLS-KP aggregate signature scheme [3]
Setup,KeyGen,Agg Same as BGLS (Table 3)
Sign(sk,m) Same as BLS-KP (Table 2)
AggVer(σA,(pk1,m1), . . . ,(pkk,mk)) ∏ki=1 e(H(pki||mi),y2,i) ?= e(σA,g2)
Table 5: BGLS-KP-KW aggregate signature scheme [3]
Setup,KeyGen Same as BGLS (Table 3)
Sign(sk,m) (σ = H(b||pk||m)sk,b) ∈ G1×{0,1}
Agg((σ1,b1), . . . ,(σn,bk)) (σA =∏ki=1σi,b1, . . . ,bk) ∈ G1×{0,1}k
AggVer(σA,(pk1,m1), . . . ,(pkk,mk),b1, . . . ,bk) ∏ki=1 e(H(bi||pki||mi),y2,i) ?= e(σA,g2)
In the next section, we determine whether similar results hold for BGLS in our multi-user security
model. First, we examine whether there is also a tight reduction from BGLS-KP security in the
multi-user model to BLS-KP security in the multi-user model. Next, we determine whether the
Katz-Wang trick is enough to yield a tight security reduction for BGLS-KP-KW in the multi-user
model.
3.3 BGLS Security in a Truly Multi-User Setting
In the standard model, it is not obvious how to reduce the security of multi-user BGLS-KP to the
security of multi-user BLS-KP: a BLS forger would need to isolate one component of the BGLS
forger’s aggregate signature, which requires being able to compute signatures on messages by users
whose keys are chosen by the BGLS-KP forger. In the random oracle model, however, it is possible
to obtain a tight reduction from BGLS-KP to BLS-KP security in the multi-user setting, as the next
theorem proves. See Figure 6 for an illustration of the reduction.
Theorem 2 (Reduction from multi-user BGLS-KP security to multi-user BLS-KP security).
If the BLS-KP signature scheme is resistant to multi-user (t ′,ε,n,qh,q′s)-existential forgery under
adaptive chosen-message attacks (MU-EUF-CMA), then the BGLS-KP aggregate signature scheme
is resistant to multi-user (t,ε,n,nmax,qh,qs)-existential aggregate forgery under adaptive chosen-
message attacks (MU-A-EUF-CMA), for any t,ε,n,nmax,qh, and qs satisfying
t = t ′− (qh+nmax+1)te+(nmax−1)tm and
qs = q′s−nmax+1.
Proof. We proceed by proving the contrapositive: given a multi-user BGLS-KP (t,ε,n,nmax,qh,qs)-
aggregate forger FA, we build a multi-user (t ′,ε,n,qh,q′s)-forger F for BLS-KP. F receives n
challenge public keys (pk1, . . . ,pkn) and can query a hashing oracle H and a signing oracle Σn. F
givesFA the same n public keys and must simulate a hashing oracle H′ and signing oracle Σ′n. When
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H H′
Σn Σ′n
Σn
compute σ∗ =(
σ∗A ·
(
∏i∈IGK Signgki(m
∗
i )
·∏i∈INK y′1,irnki
)−1)|ID|−1
multi-user
(t,ε,n,nmax,qh,qs)-
BGLS-KP aggre-
gate forger FA
multi-user (t ′,ε,n,qh,q′s)-
BLS-KP forger F
(pk1, . . . ,pkn)
(σ ′,m∗1, i
∗)
(pk1, . . . ,pkn)
pki||m′
H(pki||m′)
m
H′(m) =
{
H(m′) if m = pki||m′
g1r else
(m, i)
Signi(m)
(m, i)
Sign′i(m) = Signi(m)
(m∗i ,gki)
for i ∈ IGK
Signgki(m
∗
i )
(
σ∗A,m
∗
1, . . . ,m
∗
k , i
∗,pk′2, . . . ,pk
′
k
)
Figure 6: Reduction from multi-user BGLS-KP security to multi-user BLS-KP security.
FA makes a hash query, the reply depends on the message’s format:
H′(m) =
{
H(m′) if m = pk||m′ for some pk ∈ {pk1, . . . ,pkn}
g1r,r←$Zp else.
In the first case,F must query H. In the second case,F records (m,r). WhenFA queries Σ′n with
(m, i),F in turn queries Σn with (m, i) and replies toFA with Sign′i(m) = Signi(m).
After time at most t and with probability at least ε , FA outputs a valid aggregate forgery
(σ∗A,m
∗
1, . . . ,m
∗
k , i
∗,pk′2, . . . ,pk
′
k) for some k ∈ [nmax], where (m∗1, i∗) was not queried to Σ′n. For
simplicity, let pk′1 = pki∗ . Partition the indices [k] into the following three sets of “duplicates,” “new
keys,” and “given keys”:
• ID := {i ∈ [k] : m∗i = m∗1 and pk′i = pk′1}
• INK := {i ∈ [k] : pk′i /∈ {pk1, . . . ,pkn}}
• IGK := {i ∈ [k]\ ID : pk′i = pkgki for some gki ∈ [n]}
The set ID contains at least one element, 1. For each i in INK ,F looks up the logarithm of H′(pk′i||m∗i )
to base g1, i.e., the value of rnki such that H
′(pk′i||m∗i ) = g1rnki . For each i in IGK , F queries the
signing oracle Σn with (m∗i ,gki) to get Signgki(m
∗
i ). SinceFA output a valid forgery, σ∗A satisfies the
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following equations:
e(σ∗A,g2)
=∏
i∈ID
e(H(pki∗ ||m∗1),y2,i∗) · ∏
i∈INK
e(g1
rnki ,y′2,i) · ∏
i∈IGK
e(H(pkgki ||m∗i ),y2,gki)
= e(H(pki∗ ||m∗1),y2,i∗)|ID| · ∏
i∈INK
e(y′1,i
rnki ,g2) · ∏
i∈IGK
e(Signgki(m
∗
i ),g2)
= e(H(pki∗ ||m∗1)|ID|,y2,i∗) · e
(
∏
i∈INK
y′1,i
rnki · ∏
i∈IGK
Signgki(m
∗
i ),g2
)
.
Therefore,F is able to compute the following signature on (m∗1, i
∗):
σ∗ =
σ∗A ·
(
∏
i∈INK
y′1,i
rnki · ∏
i∈IGK
Signgki(m
∗
i )
)−1|ID|−1 mod p .
|ID|−1 mod p exists as long as |ID| < p, which is a reasonable assumption since otherwise F
could find a secret key by trial exponentiation. F outputs (σ∗,m∗1, i
∗), which is valid because
e(σ∗,g2) = e(H(pki∗ ||m∗1),y2,i∗)).
The additional work done byF was computing at most qh+nmax+1 exponentiations and nmax−1
multiplications in G1, so t ′ ≤ t+(qh+nmax+1)te+(nmax−1)tm. F made at most as many hashing
queries asFA, qh, and it made q′s ≤ qs+nmax−1 signing queries. It always succeeds wheneverFA
succeeds, so ε ′ = ε . Thus, we have built a multi-user forger for BLS-KP given a multi-user aggregate
forger for BGLS-KP with the required time and query bounds.
The previous reduction is tight. We can compose it with the reduction from multi-user BLS-KP
security to single-user BLS security (Theorem 1) and the security reduction for single-user BLS
security. The result is a security reduction for BGLS-KP based on the co-CDH problem that has a
tightness gap of about qs.
Given that there is a tight security reduction for BGLS in the chosen-key model due to Katz
and Wang, it is natural to wonder whether this result can be lifted to the multi-user model. Our
last theorem provides an affirmative answer for this variant of BGLS-KP: there is a tight security
reduction, illustrated in Figure 7, for BGLS-KP-KW in the multi-user setting.
Theorem 3 (Security reduction for multi-user BGLS-KP-KW). If the co-CDH problem is (t ′,ε ′)-
hard in G1×G2, then the BGLS-KP-KW aggregate signature scheme is resistant to multi-user
(t,ε,n,nmax,qh,qs)-existential aggregate forgery under adaptive chosen-message attacks (MU-A-
EUF-CMA), for any t,ε,n,nmax,qh, and qs satisfying
t = t ′− (2n+qh+qs+2nmax+1)te+(2n+qh+qs+2n)tm and
ε = 2ε ′.
Proof. We show how to build a solver S for the co-CDH problem given an aggregate forger
FA for BGLS-KP-KW. S receives an instance of the co-CDH problem, a triple (h,g1x
∗
,g2x
∗
) ∈
G1×G1×G2, for some unknown integer x∗ ∈ Zp. It must compute hx∗ ∈ G1. First,S givesFA n
public keys of the form pki = (g1x
∗ ·g1ri ,g2x∗ ·g2ri), where ri←$Zp. For each of these i,S records
(i,ri). WhenFA requests the hash of a message m,S ’s reply depends on the message’s format:
H(m) =
{
hb⊕bm′,i ·g1s if m = b||pk||m′ where b ∈ {0,1}, pk= pki for an i ∈ [n]
g1s else
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HΣn
compute hx
∗
=
(
σ∗A ·
(
∏i∈INK y
′
1,i
si
·∏i∈IRH y1,gki si ·∏i∈IHH hrgki (g1x
∗
)si
· g1si·rgki )−1
)|IHH |−1
multi-user
(t,ε,n,nmax,qh,qs)-
BGLS-KP-KW
aggregate forger FA
(t ′,ε ′) co-CDH solver S
(
h,g1x
∗
,g2x
∗)
hx
∗
(pki, . . . ,pkn)
where pki =
(
g1x
∗ ·g1ri,g2x∗ ·g2ri
)
, ri←$Zp
m
H(m) =
{
hb⊕bm′,i ·g1s if m = b||pk||m′
g1s else
(m, i)
Signi(m) = (bm,i,(g1x
∗ ·g1ri)s)
(
σ∗A,m
∗
1, . . . ,m
∗
k ,
i∗,pk′2, . . . ,pk
′
k,b
∗
1, . . . ,b
∗
k
)
Figure 7: Security reduction for multi-user BGLS-KP-KW.
for some s←$Zp, where bm′,i←${0,1}. In the first case,S stores (m′, i,bm′,i) and (m′, i,b,s); in the
second case,S stores (m,s).
WhenFA queries the signing oracle Σn with (m, i),S always chooses to sign with b = bm,i. It
looks up the value of s corresponding to (m, i,b) and returns Signi(m) = (b,(g1x
∗ ·g1ri)s), which is a
valid signature since (g1x
∗ ·g1ri)s = (g1s)x∗+ri = H(b||pki||n)x∗+ri .
After time at most t and with probability at least ε , FA outputs a valid aggregate forgery
(σ∗A,m
∗
1, . . . ,m
∗
k , i
∗,pk′2, . . . ,pk
′
k,b
∗
1, . . . ,b
∗
k) for some k ∈ [nmax], where Σn never answered a query for
(m∗1, i
∗) with b = b∗1. For ease of notation, let pk
′
1 = pki∗ . Partition the indices [k] into the following
three sets corresponding to “new keys,” “random hashes,” and “h-dependent hashes”:
• INK := {i ∈ [k] : pk′i /∈ {pk1, . . . ,pkn}}
• IRH := {i ∈ [k]\ INK : pk′i = pkgki for some gki ∈ [n] and b∗i = bm∗i ,i}
• IHH := {i ∈ [k]\ INK : pk′i = pkgki for some gki ∈ [n] and b∗i 6= bm∗i ,i}
With probability 1/2, b∗1 6= bm∗1,i∗ and therefore 1∈ IHH . (If not, thenS aborts.) For each i∈ INK∪IRH ,
S can look up the value of si such that H′(b∗i ||pk′i||m∗i ) = g1si . Similarly, for each i ∈ IHH , S can
look up the value of si such that H′(b∗i ||pk′i||m∗i ) = hg1si . SinceFA output a valid forgery, σ∗A satisfies
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the following equations:
e(σ∗A,g2)
= ∏
i∈INK
e(g1si ,y′2,i) · ∏
i∈IRH
e(g1si ,y2,gki) · ∏
i∈IHH
e(h·g1si ,y2,gki)·
= e
(
∏
i∈INK
y′1,i
si · ∏
i∈IRH
y1,gki
si · ∏
i∈IHH
(h·g1si)skgki ,g2
)
= e
(
∏
i∈INK
y′1,i
si · ∏
i∈IRH
y1,gki
si · ∏
i∈IHH
(h·g1si)x
∗+rgki ,g2
)
= e
(
hx
∗|IHH | · ∏
i∈INK
y′1,i
si · ∏
i∈IRH
y1,gki
si · ∏
i∈IHH
hrgki (g1x
∗
)sig1
sirgki ,g2
)
.
|IHH |−1 mod p exists if |IHH |< p, a reasonable assumption, in which case the co-CDH solverS
can compute the desired value:
hx
∗
=
σ∗A
(
∏
i∈INK
y′1,i
si ∏
i∈IRH
y1,gki
si ∏
i∈IHH
hrgki (g1x
∗
)sig1
sirgki
)−1|IHH |−1 .
S had to compute 2n+qh+qs+2nmax+1 exponentiations and 2n+qh+qs+2n multiplications in
G1 or G2. S succeeds wheneverFA does and b∗1 6= bm∗1,i∗ , so ε ′ ≥ ε/2, as required.
Although the length of a BGLS-KP-KW aggregate signature increases by 1 bit for each component,
Bellare, Namprempre, and Neven argue that the BGLS-KP-KW scheme could be as efficient as
BGLS-KP: the tighter reduction means that a smaller prime p can be used for the same level of
security [3].
4 Conclusions
Inspired by the recent analysis of Schnorr signatures in the multi-user setting, we examined reductions
for BLS and BGLS signatures in the multi-user setting. We obtained a tight reduction from the
multi-user security of BLS-KP, a key-prefixed variant of BLS, to BLS in the single-user setting. We
introduced a notion of security (MU-A-EUF-CMA) for general aggregate signature schemes in the
multi-user setting, which we believe is more realistic than the current standard. The security of any
general aggregate signature scheme in this new multi-user setting reduces to its security in the original
chosen-key setting with a tightness loss of the number of users. For BGLS, it is possible to do better:
we presented a tight reduction from multi-user BGLS-KP security to multi-user BLS security in the
standard model. BGLS-KP is not only a natural extension of BLS-KP, which has a tight reduction to
single-user BLS, but BGLS-KP also avoids a known rogue-key attack and has no requirement for
the distinctness of (enhanced) messages. Composing this reduction with our first result—the tight
multi-user BLS-KP to single-user BLS reduction—and with the standard BLS security reduction
yields a security reduction for BGLS-KP with a tightness gap of qs. Finally, we presented a tight
security reduction for BGLS-KP-KW, the Katz-Wang variant of BGLS with key-prefixing, in the
multi-user setting. The tightness gap of this reduction is only 2, but it is in the random oracle model.
It would be interesting to perform a similar analysis on the security models for sequential aggregate
signature schemes.
16
Although the importance of developing appropriate security models may be well known, inter-
preting the tightness of security reductions is still difficult. In this paper, we proved that prefixing a
random bit to each enhanced message makes the BGLS-KP security reduction tight in the random
oracle model. However, without these single bits, which are sent in the clear with the signature, the
security reduction may lose tightness by a factor of up to qs, the number of signature queries an
adversary can make—which could be as much as 220. The question of which of these two results
should guide the choice of parameter sizes in practice is difficult to answer.
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